INTRODUCTION
The legal aspects of epilepsy encompass all the issues that are encountered in the legal considerations that affect any person's everyday life. These areas include all those experiences that involve the home, work, driving, inter-personal relationships and virtually every aspect of daily living. There is no reason to suspect that these legal issues should be any different to those facing people who do not have epilepsy. The real difference is that the person with epilepsy has a stigmatizing condition which further impacts upon these experiences which are magnified when encountering people who are ignorant of what it means to have epilepsy or for that matter any other similar chronic medical illness.
Unlike many chronic illnesses, epilepsy is an unpredictable condition in which there are a variety of different seizure types and syndromes 1, 2 . This means that each person who has epilepsy is a unique individual, as determined both by their personal makeup and by the influence that their epilepsy may exert upon who and what they are.
What follows is a brief overview of the legal aspects of epilepsy with special reference to medical issues that might emerge within the context of the Common Law environment as exists in countries like the United Kingdom, United States, South Africa or Australia. This is not intended to deny the presence of other legal systems, such as Civil Law jurisdictions as exist in Europe, but rather it acknowledges the constraints that are imposed upon the preparation of this type of limited treatise.
DUTY OF CARE
Because epilepsy is a chronic medical condition, there are specific legal issues which directly impact upon the doctor-patient relationship. Of these, the most important consideration is that of 'Duty of Care'.
By definition, duty of care represents the legal responsibilities that the carer owes to the patient and which must be provided to ensure that the carer is not the subject of litigation 3 . As stated earlier, patients with epilepsy are not greatly different from any other patient who is treated by a doctor. Within the common law perspective, namely judge made law essentially based on precedence within an adversarial adjudicated process with clearly defined hierarchical avenues for appeal, there are essentially three principal obligations owed by the medical practitioner to the patient. These include ethical obligations, obligations consequent to the law of contract and obligations which emerge from the law of torts 4, 5 .
In a brief treatise, such as this, there is little scope to fully discuss issues of ethics, as this would constitute a publication in its own right 6 . Nevertheless one cannot ignore the interaction between ethical and legal issues because this interaction will unequivocally influence any deliberation that aims to provide a comprehensive conclusion. In areas, such as research, the ethical dictates that are encompassed in Good Clinical (Research) Practice 7 take priority over those dogma that are the purvey of a strictly limited legal debate. Acceptable research methods demand adherence to a code of conduct, based on the Declaration of Helsinki 8 and usually formulated by the nation's peak health and research council 9 . These codes of conduct transcend rigid legal parameters and cannot be ignored when evaluating the legal issues that prevail. Failure to respect these rules, should an unwanted consequence ensue, will more than likely result in a finding of failure to provide duty of care. Ethics are not a finite set of rules, but rather, they represent a fluid philosophically accepted set of guidelines which correspond to the prevailing morals of the particular society involved 10 . This demonstrates the cultural influence imposed upon ethical considerations within a given situation. Any single society can incorporate a number of different cultural groupings, hence the ethical considerations, within that society, can be far more varied than is the case within defined legal parameters which must accommodate the predominant community thinking.
The implications of contract law, for medical practice, are more theoretical than practical. In reality, the courts have determined that, unless the doctor has clearly promised a cure, then failure to provide a cure cannot be assumed to be a breach of contract 4 . Within the context of epilepsy, the patient cannot claim a breach of contract merely because the prescribed medication, be it one of the anti-epileptic medications, failed to control the seizures. The courts have determined that the doctor is obliged to provide a minimum standard of care for the patient, using what is termed, 'reasonable skill and care' 4, 11 .
It follows that the main scope for the consideration of duty of care emerges from torts law. Tort law is the embodiment of the Common Law system that encompasses any wrong, not arising out of contract, for which the court may determine a remedy by way of compensation or damages. As defined above, it is 'judge made' law, founded on prior case law, determined consequent to an adversarial process based on plaintiff and defendant lawyers arguing the merits of a particular circumstance. The decision of the lower court may be subjected to a hierarchical appeals process culminating in the ultimate appeals court, be it the High or Supreme Court, which determines the rationale that decides the outcome of future similar cases within its jurisdiction 12 . The main avenue for the application of torts law regarding duty of care arises from the concept of negligence 4 .
It has been established that the doctor owes a duty of care to his or her patient and failure to satisfy this responsibility, thereby causing damage to the patient, results in the doctor being liable in negligence 3 . At least in the Australian jurisdiction the courts have made it quite clear that it is the courts' authority to decide what constitutes negligence. Cases such as Rogers v Whitaker 13 have cast considerable doubt on the relevance of peer group practices which used to provide the bench mark for such deliberations, as was encapsulated in the British Bolam Principle 14 . The courts have gone so far as to review and to criticize the length of time that a doctor spends in consultation with patients, namely the capacity to overbook a practice's work-load 15 . This is especially so if it is deemed that the negligence that ensued might have been a direct consequence of such booking practices which denied the patient adequate time to present their case or to be heard. Doctors have an obligation to ensure that test results have been scrutinized, correctly reported and if necessary acted upon 16, 17 .
Failure to satisfy the absolute dictates of duty of care is not, of itself, tantamount to negligence. For litigation to be successful, the plaintiff must establish that damage was directly consequent to the alleged deficiency. In other words, there must be both cause and effect and, further, the cause must be proximal to the effect, not indirectly related, and the effect must be the damage experienced by the patient. This situation is encountered in the British case in which a workman consumed arsenic and on attendance at hospital the doctor failed to attend him with the patient leaving the emergency department without proper medical attention. The patient subsequently died but the expert testimony established that, despite the failure to attend, the condition was irreversible by the time of seeking assistance 18 . Thus an action in negligence failed.
Some areas of duty of care that do need elaborating upon, include advising the patient of all material risks to ensure informed consent 13 and also advising of any particular clinician's potential limitations with respect to others who may be more experienced 19 . Despite these considerable demands on the clinician, the plaintiff must still establish that he or she would have acted differently as a result of any particular advice that may or may not have been given 20 .
Perhaps one of the most compelling legal issues, specifically regarding epilepsy, to emerge from recent times has been the Australian case in which it was established that a competent doctor has an enforceable responsibility to attend a patient reported to be experiencing status epilepticus 21 . Failure to provide emergency intervention may constitute negligence if damages arise.
Some of the prominent domains that still need to be explored include those issues relating to: informed consent; the legal requirements that occur in the management of patients; the expectation for the doctor to properly consider the patient within the work or employment environment; issues of confidentiality; issues relating to pharmaceuticals and the prescription thereof; and the inter-professional relationships between the doctor and other health care workers, such as nurses and allied health professionals 3 .
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent represents one of the most emotive and evolving current issues within duty of care because without consent the patient lacks the empowerment to agree, or disagree, to any treatment or procedure that might be offered. It is an established dogma, within medical care, that the patient has the right for self-determination. This concept demands that the patient is in possession of all the necessary relevant information upon which to base a decision 20 .
Once it can be established that the patient had even the broadest understanding of any procedure that was to be undertaken, even if damages ensued, then the question automatically shifts from one of battery (an attack against a person) to one of negligence 22 . Thus negligence is the principal cause for action in the legal consideration of duty of care 4 .
The 24 . Informed consent, which implies that the patient has the capacity to decide their own therapy, requires the patient to be advised of all those issues, which in the opinion of the patient (and possibly the court should the matter come to litigation) are material to the patient's decision making process and which would have resulted in the patient adopting a particular behaviour.
Where the patient lacks the capacity to make the necessary decision to allow treatment there are usually protective measures to allow others to offer surrogate determination of what is in the patient's best interests 25 . There are a number of circumstances in which the patient is incapable of deciding their own treatment, these include: where the patient inherently lacks the capacity to decide due to long standing intellectual deficit, such as developmental delay or dementia; situations in which emergency treatment is required with the acute illness depriving the patient of the cognition to decide, such as status epilepticus; and circumstance in which the treatment which has already commenced has interrupted the patient's capacity to decide, as may occur in the patient who is unconscious due to an anaesthetic and the patient requires further intervention for which prior consent was not obtained. In these situations the doctor may approach a deputizing authority, such as a Guardianship Board, which has the legislated authority to decide for the patient, in the patient's best interests, where the potential benefit is determined to outweigh the risks. In emergencies the doctor may make such decision if it is deemed that there is insufficient time to seek Guardianship approval and there are no available next of kin to offer consent. Such authority is only available for the period of time in which the patient is at risk of damage and does not persist into the convalescent period once the danger has subsided 26 .
EMPLOYMENT
People with epilepsy may be recognized as disabled, and if so recognized, would come under the protection of the various anti-discrimination acts which abound through out the world 27 . There is little doubt that such a case could be mounted to argue that the person with epilepsy needs to be accommodated within the work environment 28 . This offers little comfort to the person who cannot find suitable employment.
While it is possible to legislate for a fair deal it is far more difficult to enforce such legislation. The person who has acknowledged that he or she has epilepsy will have greater difficulty finding employment and the employer will always be able to claim that the final reason for excluding the applicant with epilepsy was based upon other criteria which the successful candidate better demonstrated.
The doctor who examines the person with epilepsy, prior to employment does have a responsibility to properly advise the patient of the suitability of the considered occupation. Damage, consequent to failure to so advise, may well constitute negligence although case law in this domain is sparse 29 .
CONFIDENTIALITY
Nowhere is the question of confidentiality more tested, than in the field of epileptology, than in the domain of consideration of whose role and responsibility it is to report people with epilepsy to driving authorities 30 .
Epilepsy and driving is the subject of texts in its own right 31 and will not be further discussed in this brief overview other than to say that this whole area of legal debate is finally acknowledging the contribution that experts can play in achieving an equitable outcome 32 . It is extremely difficult for the law to recognize that each person with epilepsy is a unique individual with unique criteria which must be considered before that individual has been afforded a proper and reasonable hearing to determine his or her own fitness to drive. At least within the Australian context there has emerged an understanding that different types of epilepsy require different restrictions to the issuing of drivers' licences 31, 32 . Where the problem arises is in the context of the responsibility for reporting that individual who refuses to self-report epilepsy to driving authorities or, even more so, whether it is reasonable for every patient with epilepsy to be expected to be on a record merely because they have had seizures, now or in the past. There has been considerable debate as to what should happen, especially with regards to confidentiality, with regards to the patient who is recalcitrant to the medical advice given 33 .
When taken out of the context of driving, the question of confidentiality is far easier to address. It goes back to the very roots of modern medicine with the Hippocratic Oath and virtually all subsequent ethical dogma which proliferate within medical deliberations, namely that the sanctity of the doctorpatient relationship is one of absolute respect for all information that passes between doctor and patient 34 . While each jurisdiction will have its own guidelines for the intrusion into this privileged confidential zone, as may be required by the court, the general tenor is for the doctor and health care worker to fully respect the confidential nature of all information that passes as a consequence of the therapeutic relationship 35, 36 .
OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
When considering the legal aspects of the medical management of epilepsy it is easy to lose sight of the fact that doctors are only one component of the therapeutic team. Other contributors include nurses or pharmacists both of whom can play a major role in the everyday care of the patient and have defined responsibilities 37, 38 .
The actual definition of their legal responsibility remains not dissimilar to that of the doctor. Within the Australian context the nurse has historically been an extension of the medical practitioner's health care delivery 37 . This implies that the doctor has a specific liability to ensure that the nurse fully understands that which is expected of him or her. This in turn implies that the doctor has the added obligation to ensure proper lines of communication 39 .
A body of opinion is emerging that sees the role of the nurse practitioner or the pharmacist practitioner expanding to the point that it subsumes many of the functions of the general practitioner 37 . While this move is being generally resisted by the medical profession, it is receiving political support because it is assumed to be able to provide cheaper health care without excessive compromise on quality. Whether this attitude is correct or not is too early to predict but what can be said is that as the role of these allied health care professionals expands so will their legal liability. What is not as well recognized is that the pragmatic realism of litigation will still seek to include 'the defendant with the deepest pockets' and as such, even if this dilution of responsibility continues its current path, the doctor will remain the main target of the attorney who specializes in medical negligence litigation.
CONCLUSION
What has been presented in this brief overview is but an introduction to the relevant issues that emerge when considering legal aspects of epilepsy and the law. It has focused predominantly on clinical medicine rather than aspects of every day life which also have the capacity to generate legal debate. It is clear that the person with epilepsy will encounter all the legal issues that confront the person who does not have epilepsy, such as family law, criminal law and all facets of the legal system but these, non-medical domains, have largely have been ignored in this dissertation. The person with epilepsy has further legal considerations as a consequence of experiencing a stigmatized chronic medical illness which is essentially unpredictable until it is brought under control. Again consideration of issues resulting from this unpredictability which fall outside the clinical model have not been addressed in this discussion but their relevance to the patient cannot be ignored in the wider debate.
By far the most relevant medico-legal aspect of the topic revolves around consideration of duty of care. This duty represents the single most important facet of medico-legal responsibility between the doctor and the patient. Even this doctor-patient relationship is undergoing change with the emergence of greater therapeutic roles being ascribed to allied health professionals, such as nurses and pharmacists.
While it was once accepted that the prevailing standard of duty of care was defined by that which was practiced by a contemporaneous respected group of peers, who provided care at the same time as any alleged infraction (Bolam Principle), this no longer carries weight in law. The interpretation of what constitutes the parameters of duty of care, at least within the current Common Law jurisdictions, remains an evolving field of legal authority in which the legal profession, in particular the courts, has reserved, for itself, the final arbitration of its acceptable frame of reference.
It might be argued that the standards required for undertaking diagnosis and prescribing treatment may well place substantive authority on the evidence of practices followed by a group of peers, even this is not cast in stone. The court has the right to decide the appropriateness of the conduct of the clinician, even to the assessment of the time taken to assess each patient, within all facets of clinical practice and any behaviour which has resulted in causing harm to the patient may be deemed to represent negligence deserving of remedy. This assumes greater proportions when evaluating the adequacy of information provided to the patient and the need to warn of any material risks. In this domain the courts have determined that the practices of colleagues are largely irrelevant to deciding the final verdict of what constitutes informed consent.
The clinical role of the doctor is not limited to just diagnosis and management and comprises a comprehensive duty of care. This includes all advice given within the context of the clinical relationship. Such advice can encompass guidance with regards to employment and suitability of the work environment or the acceptability to be allowed to drive a motor vehicle. Failure to give the correct advice may result in successful litigation for negligence. Conversely, injudicious revelation of the patient's clinical status, even with the best of intentions of either protecting the patient or relevant others, may breach guidelines for confidentiality and also provide the basis for successful suit.
The purpose of this examination of the legal issues of epilepsy was not intended to generate angst amongst conscientious clinicians but, as someone who considers himself such a doctor, I am yet to perform such an overview without feeling deep seated disquiet about a perceived inability to protect oneself from litigation. At least within the Australian context, I have repeatedly heard it said that one has not had sufficient clinical exposure if one has not been the subject of at least one court action.
This review offers the clinician the unequivocal right to experience true paranoia without the diagnosis of psychosis. It further supports the ever-growing trend to practice defensive medicine although such practices will not provide conclusive defence against a claim of negligence, the final outcome of which is not decided by peers with similar medical knowledge but by a quite different professional body.
